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SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION FOR SECTION 647
DISORDERLY CONDUCT CONVICTIONS IS
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PU1ISHIVIENT
INTRODUCTION
Masturbating in public is a crime in California.' A conviction
for such conduct under Penal Code section 647(a) 2 (disorderly con-
duct) is a misdemeanor, requiring the convicted perpetrator to reg-
ister as a sex offender. 3 This added registration requirement was
enacted to protect the public from habitual sex offenders and was
not intended to serve as a formal punitive sanction. Despite its
stated purpose, registration of disorderly conduct offenders has
proven to be of limited utility in the prevention of sex crimes and
is now judicially recognized as de facto punishment.
4
Recently, the California Supreme Court has demonstrated a
marked inclination to sustain. constitutional claims based on the
prohibition of cruel or unusual punishment. The In re Lynch5 de-
cision in 1972 precipitated this judicial proclivity. Focusing pri-
marily on the Lynch development, this ,Comment reviews Califor-
nia's cruel or unusual punishment law and advances the thesis that
the registration requirement for disorderly conduct convictions is
cruel and unusual.
CALIFONIA's CRUEL OR UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT STANDARD
Historically, the Bill of Rights secured the federal guarantee
against cruel and unusual punishment to all citizens. Nevertheless,
1. Such conduct falls within the ambit of several separate Penal Code
sections. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 647 (a) (West Supp. 1975) (disorderly
conduct); id. § 314 (West 1970) (indecent exposure); id. § 650' (outraging
public decency); id. § 415 (West Supp. 1975) (disturbing the peace). Police
discretion is generally responsible for the particular section of the Penal
Code under which the action is brought. Discussion will be limited to sec-
tion 647 (a).
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647 (a) (West Supp. 1975). It states that every
person who either solicits anyone to engage in or engages in lewd or disso-
lute conduct in any public place is guilty of a misdemeanor.
3. See id. § 290.
4. See notes 34-37 infra and accompanying text.
5. 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972).
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the lack of objective standards for ascertaining what is cruel and
unusual caused centuries of disuse." California's cruel or unusual
punishment proscription suffered from a similar lack of use.
Article I, section 6 of the California Constitution proscribes "cruel
or unusual"7 punishments, as contrasted to the United States con-
stitutional standard of "cruel and unusual." The disjunctive word-
ing prompted speculation that the California draftsmen intended
a broader proscription than the federal standard.8  In two recent
decisions, the California Supreme Court read a good deal of doc-
trinal significance into this disjunctive wording. The first is the
1972 decision of People v. Anderson,9 holding capital punishment
cruel and unusual under article I, section 6.10 The court stated
that the proper test for determining whether a punishment is cruel
or unusual can be discerned from the "evolving standards of de-
cency that marks the progress of a maturing society."'1  The 1972
opinion of In re Lynch12 is the second pronouncement. For the
first time, the court held that punishment is cruel or unusual when
the punishment is disproportionate to the offense committed.18
6. See Mosk, The Eighth Amendment Rediscovered, 1 LOYOLA L.A. L.
REv. 4 (1968); Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the
Substantive Criminal Law, 79 HAmv. L. Rsv. 635 (1966); Note, Revival of
the Eighth Amendment: Development of Cruel-Punishment Doctrine by the
Supreme Court, 16 STAr. L. REv. 996 (1964).
7. CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 6. It provides in pertinent part: "Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed; nor shall cruel or un-
'usual punishment be inflicted." (emphasis added). The drafters of the
California Constitution intended that cruel as well as disproportionate or
unusual punishments should be independently proscribed. See People v.
Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 634-37, 493 P.2d 880, 883-85, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152,
155-57 (1972); Mosk, The Eighth Amendment Rediscovered, 1 LOYOLA L.A.
L. REv. 4 (1968).
8. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 107 at 488 (2d ed. 1970); Mosk,
The Eighth Amendment Rediscovered, 1 LoYoIA L.A. L. REv. 4 (1968);
Packer, The Aims of the Criminal Law Revisited: A Plea for a New Look
at "Substantive Due Process", 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 490 (1971).
9. 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert. denied, 406 U.S.
958 (1972).
10. Id. at 656, 493 P.2d at 898-99, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 170-71. The Anderson
court stated that either cruel or unusual, independently, is sufficient to sup-
port a finding of unconstitutionality. In this context, however, capital pun-
ishment was found to contravene both legs of the test. Accord, Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 958 (1972). But in 1972, art. I, § 27 was added to the
California Constitution purporting to nullify the Anderson holding. How-
ever, "nothing in art. I, § 27 indicates that the word 'unusual' may no longer
be interpreted literally." People v. Schueren, 10 Cal. 3d 553, 560, 516 P.2d
833, 838, 111 Cal. Rptr. 129, 134 (1973).
11. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 648, 493 P.2d 880, 893, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 152, 165 (1972), quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
12. 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972).
13. Id. at 424, 503 P.2d at 930, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 226. The Lynch court
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Many viewed Lynch's disproportionality concept 14 as a doctrinal
innovation.15 In truth, this proportionality notion is not new.'6
Rather, the distinguishing feature of In re Lynch is its transforma-
tion of the vague proscription of cruel or unusual punishment into
a more specific mandate. Lynch particularlizes the Anderson
standard and announces a modern fundamental canon of decency;
the punishment must be proportional to the offense.
Prior to Lynch only one California case"' in over one hundred
years, sustained a cruel or unusual punishment claim under article
I, section 6. Since Lynch, however, the California courts have sus-
tained fourteen cruel or unusual claims utilizing the disproportion-
ality analysis.' 8 Lynch's progeny clearly indicate that the Califor-
nia courts are propitiously entertaining claims based on the Lynch
struck down the recidivist provision of California Penal Code section 314
which made a second conviction for indecent exposure punishable by one
year to life imprisonment.
14. The Lynch court developed three techniques for determining dispro-
portionality. See text accompanying note 44 infra.
15. For analysis of the In re Lynch decision, see Comment, California's
Cruelty Criteria: Evaluating Sentences After In re Lynch, 25 HAST. L.J.
636 (1974); Comment, Constitutional Law: Cruel or Unusual Punishment-
In re Lynch, 6 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 416 (1973); Comment, Cruel or Unusual
Punishments in California: New Problems in Fitting Punishment to Crimes,
12 SAN DiEGo L. REV. 359 (1975); Comment, Marijuana Possession and the
California Prohibition of Cruel or Unusual Punishment, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
1136 (1974).
16. This concept was first stated in a dissenting opinion in O'Neil v. Ver-
mont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1892). Nevertheless, the genesis of the law is
probably Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). The Weems Court
established three criteria for evaluating sentences; (1) punishment should
be graduated and proportional to the offense, (2) standards of justice
should evolve as public opinion becomes enlightened by justice and (3) the
punishment is sufficient if its purposes of deterrence and reformation are
fulfilled. Id. at 367, 378, 381.
17. Ex parte Garner, 179 Cal. 409, 177 P. 162 (1918). The court held that
a judge should not have unbridled power to summarily commit a citizen
to prison for a term of years for constructive contempt. This decision could
have been cited by the Lynch court, but was not. Id. at 414-15, 177 P. at
165.
18. Learning v. Municipal Ct., 12 Cal. 3d 813, 528 P.2d 745, 117 Cal. Rptr.
657 (1974); In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 519 P.2d 1073, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649
(1974); In re Walker, 10 Cal. 3d 764, 518 P.2d 1129, 112 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1974);
People v. Schueren, 10 Cal. 3d 553, 516 P.2d 833, 111 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1973);
People v. Ruiz, 49 Cal. App. 3d 739, 122 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1975); People v.
Keogh, 46 Cal. App. 3d 919, 120 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1975); People v. Thomas,
41 Cal. App. 3d 861, 116 Cal. Rptr. 739 (1975); People v. Lizarraga, 43 Cal.
App. 3d 815, 118 Cal. Rptr. 208 (1975); People v. Murphy, 42 Cal. App. 3d
81, 116 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1974); People v. Thomas, 41 Cal. App. 3d 861, 115
analysis, and will not permit punishment to be inordinately dispro-
portional to -the crime.19
In sum, People v. Anderson2 0 and In re Lynch 21 establish Cali-
fornia's analytic framework for determining whether a sanction vio-
lates the cruel or unusual proscription of article I, section 6. Ander-
son permits the party to argue that the sanction offends contempo-
rary standards of decency. This standard draws upon an evolving
contemporary society to define cruel and unusual. Lynch allows
a party to claim that the punishment is disproportionate to the of-
fense committed. In essence, Lynch represents one facet of the
Anderson standard; a sanction which is disproportionate to the of-
fense committed violates the contemporary standard of decency,
and is, therefore, cruel, unusual and unconstitutional.
THE CALIFORNEA SEX REGISTRATION LAW:
REGISTRATION As PMISHIVMENT
Section 290 of the Penal Code requires every person convicted
Cal. Rptr. 393 (1974); People v. Malloy, 41 Cal. App. 3d 944, ,116 Cal.
Rptr. 592 (1974); People v. Romo, 39 Cal. App. 3d 326, 114 Cal. Rptr.
289 (1974), rehearing denied, 14 Cal. 3d 189, 534 P.2d 1015, 121 Cal. Rptr.
111 (1975); In re Griffin, 39 Cal. App. 3d 279, 114 Cal. Rptr. 74 (1974);
People v. Draper, 29 Cal. App. 3d 465, 105 Cal. Rptr. 653 (1973).
19. For example, in 1973, the California Supreme Court discovered that
assault with a deadly weapon with the intent to commit murder is punish-
able by 1 to 14 years imprisonment, while its lesser included offense, as-
sault with a deadly weapon, carried a potential life sentence. It corrected
this anomalous situation by limiting the sentence for assault with a deadly
weapon to 14 years. People v. Schueren, 10 Cal. 3d 553, 561-62, 516 P.2d
833, 838-39, 111 Cal. Rptr. 129, 134-35 (1973). Similarly, in 1974, a recidivist
provision of the Health and Safety Code which automatically precluded
parole consideration for 10 years for a second offender narcotics criminal
was held to be cruel or unusual. In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 929, 519 P.2d
1073, 1085, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649, 661 (1974). In 1975, the imposition of four
consecutive 14 year terms on four counts of forgery for checks aggregating
less than $500 was held to be disproportionate and unconstitutional. People
v. Keogh, 46 Cal. App. 3d 919, 931-34, 120 Cal. Rptr. 817, 824-25 (1975).
Incidentally, Justice Mosk of the California Supreme Court predicted such
a development: "There are straws in the wind to suggest the next section
upon which legal fashions focus will be the eighth amendment." Mosk, The
Eighth Amendment Rediscovered, 1 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 4 (1968). See
Downey v. Perini, 518 F.2d 1288 (6th Cir. 1975). Sentences of 10 to 20 years
and 20 to 40 years imprisonment for possession and sale of marijuana, im-
posed under Ohio law, were declared excessive, disproportionate, and cruel
and unusual under the eighth amendment. This il the first time a circuit
court of appeals has held a sentence unconstitutional because of its length.
The court compared the sentence imposed for this crime with other crimes
in the same and different jurisdictions. This technique is similar to tech-
niques (2) and (3) in Lynch. Id. at 1290-92.
20. 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 CaL Rptr. 152, cert. denied, 406 U.S.
958 (1972).
21. 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972).
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of certain sex crimes 22 to register with the appropriate law en-
forcement agency where he resides. Fifteen different sex crimes
of varying severity are specifically enumerated in section 290.23
These registrable offenses range from forcible rape and child
molestation to indecent exposure and disorderly conduct. Regard-
less of the crime's severity, section 290 makes no distinction in the
treatment accorded the registrant. Every registrant must report
each change of address, permanent or temporary, within ten days.
Such registration is in addition to the punishment prescribed for
the underlying offense and failure to comply with this requirement
is a misdemeanor. 24 Even though section 290 is silent as to the
duration of such registration, courts uniformly release the regis-
trant upon either successful completion of a probationary period25
or the issuance of a certificate of rehabilitation.
2 6
The stated purpose of the sex offender registration law is public
protection.2 7  It was enacted in 1947 as an emergency measure to
22. CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (West Supp. 1975). Section 290 lists the fol-
lowing as registrable offenses: id. § 220 ('West 1970) (assault with intent
to commit rape); id. § 266 (procuring, assignation, and seduction); id. §
267 (abduction for prostitution); id. § 268 (seduction); id. § 285 (incest);
id. § 286 (sodomy); id. § 288 (molesting child under 14); id. § 288a (oral
sex perversion); id. § 647a(1) (child molestation); id. § 261(2) (forcible
rape); id. § 261(3) (rape by use of threats or drugs); id. § 272 (West Supp.
1975) (contributing to the delinquency of a minor); id. § 314 (West 1970)
(indecent exposure); id. §§ 647(a), (d) (West Supp. 1975) (disorderly con-
duct, and mentally disordered sex offenders (MDSO)).
Registration requirements include: (a) an information statement signed
by the registrant; (b) fingerprints; (c) a photograph; (d) every change
of address must be reported within 10 days, and (e) failure to comply is
a misdemeanor.
23. CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (West Supp. 1975).
24. Id.
25. See id. § 1203.4. The registrant who proceeds under section 1203.4
is released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from his conviction.
Section 1203.4 ij applicable to the section 290 registration sanction. Kelly
v. Municipal Ct., 160 Cal. App. 2d 38, 44, 324 P.2d 990, 994 (1958).
26. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.5 (West 1970).
27. 1949 Cal. Stat. § 2, 1st extra sess., ch. 13 at 27.
The number and nature of sexual crimes has increased within re-
cent months to such an extent as to pose a threat to the health,
welfare and safety of the citizenry of this state.... To afford
immediate protection to the citizens, it is necessary that this act
shall take effect immediately. Id. at 28.
Accord, In re Birch, 10 Cal. 3d 314, 321-22, 515 P.2d 12, 16-17, 110 Cal.
Rptr. 212, 216-17 (1973); In re Smith, 7 Cal. 3d 362, 367, 497 P.2d 807, 810-
11, 102 Cal. Rptr. 335, 338-39 (1972); Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal.
help law enforcement agencies combat the dramatic increase in sex
crimes, under the belief that sex offenses were highly recidivis-
tic. 28 The legislature also believed that compulsory registration
would protect society by making the sex offender "readily avail-
able" for police surveillance. Since registration merely elicits in-
formation, it was felt that the inconvenience to the registrant was
inconsequential when balanced against societal protection. 29
Its stated purpose notwithstanding, registration has de facto puni-
tive aspects. A person convicted of a registrable sex offense loses
his California teaching credential.30 It may also render him subject
to inquiry as to whether he is a mentally disordered sex offender.3 1
Unlike other juvenile misdemeanor crimes, registrable sex offenses
cannot be sealed at the juvenile's request.32 In addition, the regis-
trant may be required to abstain from the use of alcoholic beverages
as a condition of probation.33 The California Supreme Court recog-
nizes registration's punitive impact and has overturned convictions
because of its unusual severity.34 In the 1973 decision of In re
Birch,35 the court reversed a conviction under Penal Code section
647(a) asserting that the legislature could not rationally conclude
-that a man observed by the police urinating outside a closed Jack-
in-the-Box at 2 a.m. required constant police surveillance to protect
society.36 The court stated:
2d 674, 686-87, 349 P.2d 974, 982-83, 3 Cal. Rptr. 158, 166-67 (1960); Kelly
v. Municipal Ct., 160 Cal. App. 2d 38, 45, 324 P.2d 990, 994 (1958).
28. See authorities cited note 27 supra. Section 290 is the only criminal
registration statute enacted by the California legislature. This is anomalous
when other recidivistic crimes receive no such precautions; e.g., arson and
narcotic offenses. See Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. 2d 674, 686-87,
349 P.2d 974, 982-83, 3 Cal. Rptr. 158, 166-67 (1960).
29. 28 OP. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 178, 179 (1956). Accord, People v. Mackey,
58 Cal. App. 123 (1922). Registration is not a penalty because it is not
penal retribution or the suffering in person, rights or property. Id. at 130.
See Comment, Compulsory Registration: A Vehicle of Mercy Discarded, 3
CALIF. W.L. REV. 195 (1967). Section 290 was not enacted as a penalty.
"[I]t is believed that it is beneficial to keep an accurate record of the pres-
ent whereabouts of those convicted of crimes recidivistic in nature." Id.
at 199.
30. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 12912, 13207 (West 1975). See also Purifoy v.
Board of Educ., 30 Cal. App. 3d 187, 106 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1973).
31. See CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 6302 (West 1972).
32. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.45 (West Supp. 1975).
33. See id. § 1203.02 (West 1970).
34. In re Birch, 10 Cal. 3d 314, 321, n.8, 515 P.2d 12, 16, n.8, 110 Cal. Rptr.
212, 216, n.8 (1973); In re Smith, 7 Cal. 3d 362, 367, 497 P.2d 807, 810-11,
102 Cal. Rptr. 335, 338-39 (1972); Barrows v. Municipal Ct., 1 Cal. 3d 821,
825-27, 464 P.2d 483, 485-87, 83 Cal. Rptr. 819, 821-23 (1970).
35. 10 Cal. 3d 314, 515 P.2d 12, 110 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1973).
36. Id. at 321, 515 P.2d at 16, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
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Although the stigma of a short jail sentence should eventually fade,
the ignominious badge carried by the convicted sex offender can
remain for a lifetime. 37
Certainly, the registration of known pedophiliacs, 38 rapists and
other offenders using force upon their victims may be justified.
The serious nature of these offenses demands special treatment.
Public protection from this type of sex offender clearly outweighs
any harm caused by registration.3 9 On the other hand, -the minor,
victimless sex crimes of Penal Code section 647 do not warrant the
added registration sanction. Contrary to what the legislature be-
lieved in 1949, the registration of these minor sex offenders does
not promote public protection.40  Law enforcement agencies are
overwhelmed by the vast number of relatively harmless misde-
meanor registrants, and this administrative burden diverts valuable
police resources from the detection and prevention of more serious
sex crimes.41  Consequently, registration in this context not only
harms society, but it also inflicts a severe punishment on the regis-
trant. In short, registration is punishment, and its imposition as
a sanction must be justified under -the principles announced in
Anderson and Lynch.
THE Lynch ANALYsis: THE REGISTRATION REQUIRMENT
Is DISPROPORTIONAL To THE OFFENSE
In re Lynch 42 held that a punishment is cruel or unusual if it
37. Id. at 321-22, 515 P.2d at 17, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
38. A pedophiliac is defined as a person having a preference or an addic-
tion to unusual sexual practices in which children are the preferred object.
WEBSTER'S TB=n NEW INTERNAiONAL DICTIONARY 1665 (unabr. 15th ed.
1967).
39. Project, The Consenting Adult Homosexual and the Law: An Em-
pirical Study of Enforcement and Administration in Los Angeles County,
13 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 647 (1966). "Requiring offenders who are neither pedo-
philes nor disposed to using force to register impairs the effectiveness of
registration as an aid to law enforcement by adding thousands of superflu-
ous names to the rolls." Id. at 794.
40. Id. "Since there does not seem to be any functional value to registra-
tion as an aid to enforcement, there is no justification for the resulting
stigma." Id. at 738. See Comment, Compulsory Registration: A Vehicle
of Mercy Discarded, 3 CALIF. W.L. REv. 195 (1967). The author recommends
that since there are no lesser included offenses for the registrable crimes,
section 290 should be amended to allow judicial discretion in determining
whether a particular defendant should register. Id. at 200.
41. See Project, supra note 39, at 794.
42. 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972).
is disproportionate to the crime committed.43 Lynch established
three "techniques" for applying this disproportionality concept:
(1) Examine the nature of the offense and the offender with regard
to the degree of danger both present to society;
(2) Compare the challenged penalty with other penalties for dif-
ferent offenses in the same jurisdiction; and
(3) Compare the challenged penalty with the punishments pre-
scribed for the same offense in other jurisdictions.
44
Nature Of The Offense: Degree Of Danger To Society
The factors relevant to the first technique include: (1) The vio-
lent nature of the offense; (2) the injury to the victim and society;
(3) whether there are rational gradations of culpability and (4) a
weighing ,of the statute's penal purposes.
45
First, the offenses listed in section 647 of 'the Penal Code40 are
minor crimes of a nonviolent nature. Section 647 defines eight sub-
stantive offenses threatening public peace and safety. Ever since
the mid-seventeenth century when immoral sexual behavior was
first criminalized such offenses were minor misdemeanors. 47 In-
deed, more than a century of California statutory law has treated
these crimes as minor violations.48 Other states also regard this
43. Id. at 424, 503 P.2d at 930, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
44. Id. at 425-27, 503 P.2d at 930-32, 105 Cal. Rptr. 226-28. It should be
observed that this disproportionality concept is in actuality an equal protec-
tion argument under the guise of cruel or unusual punishment. This ob-
servation will become more apparent in the textual analysis presented
under technique (2). See text accompanying note 79 infra.
45. The first three factors were considered by the Lynch court. The
fourth factor was added by the court in In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 919,
519 P.2d 1073, 1078, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649, 654 (1974).
46. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647 (West Supp. 1975). Section 647 reads, in part:
Every person who commits any of the following acts shall be guilty
of disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor:
(a) who solicits anyone to engage in or engages in lewd or disso-
lute conduct in any public place or in any place open to the public
or exposed to public view.
(d) who loiters in or about any toilet open to the public for the
purpose of engaging in or soliciting any lewd or lascivious or any
unlawful act.
See 36 CALIF. S.B.J. 643, 801-02 (1961). For a historical development of Cal-
ifornia's vagrancy law, see Sherry, Vagrants, Rogues and Vagabonds-Old
Concepts in Need of Revision, 48 CALIF. L. Rv. 557 (1960). The intent of
the legislature in redrafting section 647 was to abandon the concept of status
and focus upon conduct. Id. at 572. The legislature adopted Professor
Sherry's proposed draft in full. 1959-61 REPORT OF ASSEMBLY INTEuM Com-
mTTEE ON CRIMINAL PRoCEDURE, in 2 CAL. APPENDIX TO THE JOURNAL OF THE
ASSEMBLY 8 (1961).
47. Rex v. Sidley, 82 Eng. Rep. 1036 (1657-1670).
48. Section 647 of the Penal Code was first enacted in 1872. Subsection
(5) of the then section 647 is the present section 647 (a) proscribing lewd
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conduct as a minor offense punishable by no more than a small
fine and/or a short term of imprisonment.49
When the sex registration law was enacted in 1947, the eight sec-
tion 647 crimes were not registrable offenses.50 An extraordinary
session of the legislature in 1949 added two of these offenses to
the registration law as an urgency measure to curb the striking
increase in sex crimes.51 Section 647(a) is the first of these two
offenses.5 2 It proscribes two acts-publicly soliciting and publicly
engaging in lewd or dissolute conduct.53 As applied, section 647 (a)
is the primary provision for prosecuting public homosexual con-
duct.54 Section 647(d) 55 is the second offense carrying the added
registration requirement. It prohibits loitering around public
toilets for the purpose of soliciting or engaging in lewd conduct.56
Both sections 647 (a) and (d) serve the same purpose and pro-
scribe identical misconduct.57 They differ in -that (d) requires the
offender to be near a public toilet while (a) does not. The practical
effect of this overlap has been the virtual elimination of section
647(d) as a separate substantive offense. In fact, only one convic-
or dissolute conduct. In its original form, it carried the sanction of
a misdemeanor. For an interesting account of this development, see Sherry,
Vagrants, Rogues and Vagabonds--Old Concepts in Need of Revision, 48
CALI. L. REv. 557, 562 (1960).
49. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 157-58, nn. 1-2
(1972). For a review of interstate comparisons, see Project, supra note 39,
at 657-85.
50. 1947 Cal. Stat. § 1, 57th sess., ch. 1124 at 2562-63. This is the enacting
statute of § 290. Sections 647 (a) and (d) were not included.
51. 1949 Cal. Stat. § 2, 1st extra. sess., ch. 13 at 27.
52. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647 (a) (West Supp. 1975).
53. In re Henderson, 61 Cal. 2d 541, 542, 393 P.2d 685, 686, 39 Cal. Rptr.
373, 374 (1964); Silva v. Municipal Ct., 40 Cal. App. 3d 733, 736, 115 Cal.
Rptr. 479, 481-82 (1974); People v. Mesa, 265 Cal. App. 2d 746, 750-51, 71
Cal. Rptr. 594, 597 (1968); People v. Dudley, 250 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 955,
959, 58 Cal. Rptr. 557, 559 (1967).
54. See Project, supra note 39, at 737.
55. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647 (d) (West Supp. 1975).
56. In re Cregler, 56 Cal. 2d 308, 310-11, 363 P.2d 305, 307, 14 Cal. Rptr.
289, 291 (1961).
57. Section 647(d) was originally aimed at protecting the public from
professional pickpockets and thieves loitering in places in which they most
conveniently and lucratively ply their trade. In re Cregler, 56 Cal. 2d 308,
311, 363 P.2d 305, 306, 14 Cal. Rptr. 289, 290 (1961). Nevertheless, the courts
have transformed it into a duplicative offense of section 647 (a) by requiring
lewd intent to sustain a conviction. See note 46 supra.
tion5s resting solely upon section 647(d) has been appealed since
1961. Consequently, the discussion will focus chiefly on section 647
(a), but the arguments presented and the conclusion reached apply
equally to both sections.
The sexual misconduct prohibited by section 647 (a) is nonviolent.
Under California law, "lewd or dissolute" conduct means obscene
behavior, which is sexual conduct that is "grossly repugnant" and
"patently offensive" to "generally accepted notions of what is ap-
propriate" and decent according to contemporary community stand-
ards.5 ) The solicitation portion of 647(a) is no more than a "re-
quest" which has been deemed undeserving of first amendment pro-
tection.60 A single verbal request does not support an inference
that the solicitor is a pervert or inexorably given to sexual debauch-
ery.61 The harm in asking is minimal at most, yet one convicted
of solicitation must register as a sex offender. Similarly, mastur-
bating in public is a registrable offense under section 647(a). Cer-
tainly, such conduct is socially offensive and demands legal re-
straint, but this conduct does not rationally support the conclusion
that its perpetrator requires constant police surveillance to protect
society. Thus, publicly soliciting and engaging in obscene conduct
have been and continue to be minor offenses presenting little or
no danger to society.
Secondly, section 647 (a) is a victimless crime which produces no
real harm to the public. Modern clinical studies6 2 typically char-
acterize "lewd or dissolute" conduct as a social nuisance, rather than
a criminal activity. Findings substantiate that there is no real "vic-
tim," and any harm caused is minimal.63 Furthermore, it is the
58. Id. at 308, 363 P.2d at 305, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 289.
59. Silva v. Municipal Ct., 40 Cal. App. 3d 733, 737, 115 Cal. Rptr. 479,
482 (1974); In re Giannini, 69 Cal. 2d 563, 571, n.4, 446 P.2d 535, 541,
n.4, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655, 661, n.4 (1968), overruled on other grounds, Crown-
over v. Musick, 9 Cal. 3d 405, 431, 509 P.2d 497, 514, 107 Cal. Rptr. 681,
698 (1973).
60. Silva v. Municipal Ct., 40 Cal. App. 3d 733, 737-38, 115 Cal. Rptr. 479,
481-82 (1974).
61. See In re Smith, 7 Cal. 3d 362, 367, 497 P.2d 807, 810-11, 102 Cal. Rptr.
335, 338-39 (1972); Barrows v. Municipal Ct., 1 Cal. 3d 821, 825-27, 464 P.2d
483, 485-87, 83 Cal. Rptr. 819, 821-23 (1970).
62. Gigeroff, Mohr & Turner, Sex Offenders on Probation: Heterosexual
Pedophiles, 32 FED. PROB. 17, 21 (1968).
[M]any homosexual acts have come to be regarded as socially
offensive rather than especially dangerous ... [and] have come
to be considered public nuisances. The lack of force, violence,
coercion in its perpetration, the absence of a victim per se, and the
unlikelihood of any injury to property rights support this conclu-
sion. CAL. DEPT. OF MENTAL HYGIENE, FINAL REPORT ON SEXUAL
DEVIATIoN RESEARcH 88 (1954).
63. See Millard v. Harris, 406 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1968); REPORT OF KARL
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consensus of opinion among psychiatrists 'that sex offenders persist
in the same type of behavior; they do not progress to more serious
sex crimes.64 This opinion is confirmed by crime statistics.6 5 In
short, ,this type of sex offender usually injures no one by his con-
duct.66
Thirdly, the registration requirement does not comport with ra-
tional gradations of punishment. A conviction for violating section
647 (a) results in two forms of punishment. The first is the discre-
tionary imposition of a small fine and/or a short term of imprison-
ment.6 7  This sanction is concededly constitutional. The nondis-
cretionary registration requirement is the second punitive sanc-
tion.68 Section 290 indiseriminantly mandates an automatic sanc-
tion upon conviction without regard to the circumstances surround-
ing the offense. The child molestor felon and the "obscene" mis-
demeanant receive the same treatment under the registration stat-
ute.6 9
Finally, the registration of these minor sex offenders serves no
legitimate penal purpose. Registration was premised on the belief
that sex crimes were highly recidivistic and that it was the best
means of protecting society from recurrences.70 Psychiatric stud-
ies reveal, however, that sex offenders have one of the lowest
recidivism rates of all criminal types.71 In addition, an empirical
study72 in the Los Angeles area concluded that the current regis-
M. BowmAN, in 2 CAL. JoumRAL oF THE ASSmBLY 47 (1951). Isolated ex-
posures to acts of this nature were likely to cause psychological harm only
to a small group of uniquely sensitive women. Id. at 978. See, Project,
supra note 39. "[C]omplaints to police regarding lewd solicitations are in-
frequent ... thus homosexuals are discreet... or citizens are not outraged
by this type of behavior." Id. at 698-99.
64. Tappan, Report and Recommendations, in NEW JERsEY CoMlvIIssIoN
ON THE HABITUAL SEx OFFENDER 13-16 (1950); Guttmacher & Weihofen, Sex
Offenses, 43 J. CRmvE. L.C. & P.S. 153, 154 (1952).
65. Id.
66. In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d at 425, 503 P.2d at 931, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
67. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 647 (West Supp. 1975); § 19(a) (West 1970).
68. Id. § 290 (West Supp. 1975).
69. Observe the distinction between Penal Code section 647a-child mo-
lestation, and section 647 (a)--disorderly conduct.
70. See notes 27-29 supra.
71. Tappan, Report and Recommendations, in NEW JERSEy Co nv ssIoN
ON THE HABITUAL SEX OFFENDER 13-16 (1950).
72. Project, supra note 39.
tration system is not justified as an aid in law enforcement. 73 It
was found that the compulsory registration of obscene misdemean-
ants severely dilutes the effectiveness that registration might other-
wise provide in the prevention of child molestation, forcible rape,
and other violent sex crimes.7 4 Thus, public protection, the very
.basis upon which sex offender registration is premised, is not ef-
fectuated.
Although penal purpose is a factor,
if there is no reason to believe that it serves any penal purpose
more effectively than some less severe punishment, then the con-
tinued infliction of that punishment violates the command of the
Clause that the State may not inflict inhuman and uncivilized pun-
ishments upon those convicted of crimes. 75
The nondiscretionary registration penalty is excessive. As imposed
on 647 (a) type sex offenders, its potential detriment to the individ-
ual is great, while there is no offsetting benefit to society. Contin-
uing to inflict registration on disorderly conduct offenders, when
the fundamental premise of societal protection is known to be non-
existent, is tantamount to a sanction for status7 -the status of
a homosexual. 77
In summary, these four factors under the first Lynch proportion-
ality -technique amply reveal that the harm posed by these "ob-
scene" crimes is negligible. Section 647 (a) constitutes a victimless,
minor, nonviolent crime which "gains nothing" for the offender and
"injures nobody."7 8  The registration sanction annexed to this
crime is clearly disproportionate to the degree of danger this offense
and its typical offender present to society.
Disproportionate Punishment In The Same Jurisdiction
The second Lynch technique is a comparative evaluation of the
sanctions for different crimes in the same jurisdiction.7 0 Similar
73. Id. at 794.
74. Id.
75. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 282 (1972), (Brennan, J., concur-
ring).
76. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962). A California stat-
ute making it a criminal offense for a person to be addicted to narcotics
was held to be cruel and unusual because it inflicts punishment on status-
the condition of being addicted, not on overt acts. Id. at 666; In re Foss,
10 Cal. 3d 910, 922, 519 P.2d 1073, 1080, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649, 656 (1974).
77. Section 647 (a) proscribes any lewd or dissolute conduct, but its invo-
cation is primarily aimed at regulating public homosexual conduct. See
Project, supra note 39, at 737.
78. 8 Cal. 3d at 425, 503 P.2d at 931, .105 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
79. Id. at 426, 503 P.2d at 931, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 227. This type of analysis
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punishment for similar crimes is the constitutional norm. Thus,
if the Court finds the apparent dangers of one criminal activity to
be substantially less serious than the apparent dangers of crimes
carrying equal penalties, or if the Court cannot find a substantial
difference between a crime carrying a severe punishment and
crimes carrying minor punishments, it must act on that basis to find
the challenged punishment disproportionate.0
Such an evaluation of the registration requirement with punish-
ments for both similar and more serious offenses points toward the
conclusion that the requirement is unconstitutional.
A comparison of the registration sanction with similar offenses
supports a finding of unusual disproportionality. Section 647(b),81
enacted at the same time as section 647(a), prohibits soliciting or
engaging in prostitution. The distinction between (a) and (b) is
that the (b) offender is attempting to gain monetary satisfaction
in return for her obscene behavior. While (a) and (b) carry the
same possibility of fine and/or imprisonment, only the (a) offender
is required to register.8 2 Consequently, the legislature must be-
lieve that by asking for or receiving money, the offender is exoner-
ated from registration. The actual reason for this disparity is un-
clear, unless, of course, prostitution is believed by the legislature
to be a more "normal" offense.
This anomaly also has resulted in questionable law enforcement
practices. A much used enforcement tactic, especially in situations
involving prostitution, is the following: In violating section 647 (b),
prostitution, a person also violates section 647 (a), solicitation- The
person is charged with both crimes. Rather than run the risk of
registration, most prefer to "cop" to prostitution, pay the $50 fine
and be done with it. But the predominant view of police officers
is that homosexual offenders should register. Therefore, homosex-
uals will be charged under section 647 (a) only.8 3
is essentially an equal protection argument. Support for this position is
derived from Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) and Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See Supreme Court Review: Cruel and
Unusual Punishment, 63 J. Cami. L.C. & P.S. 484 (1972).
80. Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment: An Examination
of the Eighth Amendment, 24 STAN. L. REy. 838, 863 (1972).
81. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(b) (West Supp. 1975), which states that every
person who solicits or engages in any act of prostitution is guilty of a mis-
demeanor.
82. See id. § 290.
83. See Project, supra note 39, at 737. In addition, the Project recom-
Other provisions -proscribing similar misconduct are section
311.684 which prohibits obscene live conduct performed in public,
and section 650 2
8 5 which punishes acts outraging public decency.
Both of these offenses are misdemeanors and nonregistrable.8 0
For the same "obscene" misconduct, a person could conceivably be
convicted under sections 311.6, 647(a), 647(b) and 650/ of the
Penal Code.8 7 In general, police discretion is responsible for the
particular section with which an individual is charged. Ironically,
only the 647(a) offender must register. This situation invites
abuses of prosecutorial discretion, especially since police officers
feel that homosexuals should be made to register.
88
Of even greater significance, the legislature thoroughly revised
these statutes in the same session and in the same enactment that
the registration law was amended. 80 Hence, there is no doubt the
legislature purposely intended that 647 (a) type offenders should re-
ceive more severe treatment than perpetrators of similar offenses.
Nevertheless, as previously demonstrated under the first Lynch
technique, this disparity in treatment has no legitimate foundation.
In light of the new sex law legalizing private homosexual conduct
between consenting adults,0 this relatively harsh registration
sanction associated with section 647 (a) is especially pronounced, and
constitutionally more difficult to justify.
A comparison to the penalties imposed for more serious sex
crimes yields an even more convincing case for disproportionality.
The legislature did not intend that all sex crimes be registrable.9 1
mends that a single statute should be adopted, i.e., in lieu of sections 647 (a),
650 , and 314, to avoid this misuse, and at the same time aid law enforce-
ment. Id. at 793-94. An interview with Vi. Paul Robinson, Deputy City
Attorney of San Diego, in San Diego, California, on Sept. 12, 1975, revealed
that this "copping" practice was a much used tactic, but it has now been dis-
continued in San Diego. Case law supports this police practice. To date,
there is only one reported appellate case under section 647 (a) involving
a female defendant. In re Steinke, 2 Cal. App. 3d 569, 82 Cal. Rptr. 789
(1969).
84. CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.6 (West 1970).
85. Id. § 650%.
86. Id. § 290 (West Supp. 1975).
87. Id. § 311.6 (West 1970); id. § 650 ; id. § 647(a) (West Supp. 1975);
id. § 647(b).
88. See Project, supra note 39, at 734-42.
89. 1961 Cal. Stat., Reg. Sess., ch. 2147 at 4427; Barrows v. Municipal
Ct., 1 Cal. 3d 821, 826, 464 P.2d 483, 486, 83 Cal. Rptr. 819, 822 (1970).
90. See WsT's CALFORNIA LEGISLATIVE SEIMCE, ch. 71 at 144 (1975). See
also text accompanying notes 106-108 infra.
91. The following sex crimes are not registrable offenses: CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 261(1), (4), (5) (West 1970) (rape of a female incapable through
unsoundness of mind, unconsciousness, and trickery, of giving legal con-
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Some serious offenses involving sexual misconduct with children
remain completely untouched by the registration law.9 2 Although
registration is required for a forcible rape conviction, it is not com-
pelled for the crimes of acting in concert to commit forcible oral
copulation or the abduction to compel marriage or defilement.
9 3
While these crimes of sexual violence threatening human life do
not trigger -the added registration requirement, it is unerringly ap-
plied to the far less serious 647(a) offense. Surely such disparate
treatment is indefensible.
Comparative Punishment In Other Jurisdictions
The last Lynch technique is an examination of the sanctions im-
posed in other jurisdictions for substantially similar offenses.
9 4
The underlying assumption is that the prescribed penalty for this
offense in a majority of other jurisdictions is "usual" and therefore,
probably constitutional. 5 In other words, if sex offender registra-
tion deviates substantially from the national norm, it might reason-
ably be concluded that it was the product of an overzealous and
ill-considered legislative response to a grave social problem. 96
Each state has enacted omnibus provisions proscribing substan-
tially the same conduct prohibited by section 647(a). In general,
sent); id. § 261.5 (unlawful intercourse with a female under the age of
eighteen); id. § 265 (abduction to compel marriage or defilement); id. §§
269 (a), (b) (adultery); id. § 273 (f) (West Supp. 1975) (sending a minor
to a house of prostitution); id. § 273 (g) (West 1970) (lewd or immoral con-
duct in the presence of a child); id. § 276 (soliciting an abortion); id. §
288(b) (acting in concert to commit forcible oral copulation); id. § 309
(keeping minors in a house of prostitution); id. §§ 311.2, .4, .5 (distribution
of obscene materials using children); id. § 311.6 (engaging in obscene live
conduct); id. § 313.1 (distribution of harmful matter to a minor); id. §§
315, 316 (keeping or residing in a house of prostitution); id. § 318 (pimp-
ing); id. § 647(b) (West Supp. 1975) (prostitution), and id. § 647(h) (being
a peeping tom).
92. Id. § 261.5 (West 1970) (unlawful sexual intercourse with a female
under eighteen); id. § 273 (g) (lewd or immoral conduct in the presence
of a child); id. § 309 (keeping minors in a house of prostitution); id. § 311.4
(using a minor to distribute obscene matter); id. § 273 (f) (West Supp.
1975) (sending a minor to an immoral place).
93. Id. §§ 265, 288(b) (West 1970).




these statutes are within the vagrancy laws and are invoked to reg-
ulate public homosexual conduct.97 Without exception, the offense
constitutes only a minor misdemeanor.98 Interestingly, only three
states,99 other than California, require sex offender registration.
Of these three, only Arizona has a comparable mandatory registra-
tion requirement. 100 Thus California's registration requirement
is clearly unusual and comparatively harsh making the argument
for disproportionality persuasive.
In conclusion, the Lynch analysis demonstrates that the Califor-
nia registration sanction inflicts disparate treatment on the 647 (a)
type offender. Examination under the first technique shows that
"obscene" misconduct constitutes only a minor crime, not likely to
be repeated, and of little harm to society. The comparative evalua-
tions under Lynch's second and third techniques reveal that the
"obscene" offender receives excessively harsh treatment as con-
trasted to other sex offenders in California and other states. These
findings, -taken alone, dictate the conclusion that registration, as ap-
plied to these offenders, is inordinately disproportionate, and there-
fore, repugnant to the Anderson standard of contemporary decency.
Moreover, the ensuing analysis, independent of the Lynch decision,
provides an alternative argument for finding the registration re-
quirement in this context cruel or unusual.
THE Anderson STANDARD: REGISTRATION OFFENDS
CONTEMPORARY STANDARDS OF DECENcY
People v. Anderson'0 held that punishment is cruel or unusual
97. For an interstate comparison of sanctions used in regulating public
homosexual conduct, see Project, supra note 39, at 657-85.
98. Even though each state has its own statutory definition of misde-
meanor, it is clear that the actual penalties imposed are substantially simi-
lar. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 17(a), 19a (West 1970). See also Papa-
christou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 157-58, nn.1-2 (1972).
99. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1271 to 13-1274 (West. Supp. 1974);
NEv. REv. STAT. § 207.151 (West Supp. 1973); Omo REv. CODE ANx. § 2950.01
(Baldwin Supp. 1974). Cf. ALA. CODE tit. 7A, §§ 452-58 (1966); GA. CODE
ANN. § 24-2715 (1972); Mss. CODE ANN. § 2611.5 (1972). Alabama requires
registration for offenders convicted more than twice of any felony. Georgia
and Mississippi require that the court clerk keep separate records of each
sex offender convicted. This pertains only to felonies and is not registra-
tion.
100. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1271 to 13-1274 (West Supp. 1974). Ne-
vada's sex registration law is restricted to felonies. Ohio's sex registration
law is similar to Nevada's with one additional requirement-one must be
convicted of two or more sex crimes in separate transactions to be com-
pelled to register. See statutes cited note 99 supra.
101. 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert. denied, 406 U.S.
958 (1972).
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if it offends the "evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society. '102 The Anderson court princi-
pally employed an infrequency factor to determine cruelty and un-
usualness. The fact that a punishment is infrequently imposed is
some evidence that it is cruel, unusual and offensive to contempo-
rary decency. To support a finding of infrequency, reliable statisti-
cal data is necessary. Due to the nondiscretionary imposition of
registration and its virtual uniqueness to California law, no such
empirical data exists. Consequently, Anderson's infrequency factor
is not particularly appropriate to the decency inquiry associated
with registration, but infrequency is not the sole test. There exist
other strong judicial and legislative indications that the registration
requirement contravenes contemporary decency.
California courts have recognized that registration is punishment
and are reluctant to directly impose it. 10 In addition, courts have
indirectly limited the imposition of registration by narrowing the
scope of section 647(a). "Lewd" no longer reaches all socially of-
fensive conduct, but only that conduct which is sexually motivated
and grossly repugnant.104 Evidently, the judiciary dislikes sec-
tion 647(a)'s registration feature. Hence, the judiciary's clear rec-
ognition that registration is a punitive sanction and its reluctance
to uphold registrable convictions are definite indications that regis-
tration offends contemporary decency.
A comparative examination of the sanctions imposed in other
jurisdictions furnishes further evidence. Such an examination pro-
vides an objective measure of contemporary decency in other states.
California and Arizona stand alone in the imposition of registration
as an additional sanction.' °5  Thus, on a national level, sex of-
fender registration is unusual and infrequently applied.
Perhaps the most damning evidence that registration violates con-
102. Id. at 648, 493 P.2d at 893, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 165, quoting Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
103. In re Birch, 10 Cal. 3d 314, 515 P.2d 12, 110 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1973);
In re Smith, 7 Cal. 3d 362, 497 P.2d 807, 102 Cal. Rptr. 335 (1972); Silva
v. Municipal Ct., 40 Cal. App. 3d 733, 741, 115 Cal. Rptr. 479, 484 (1974).
104. Cases cited note 103 supra. "[T]he rule clearly emerges that a per-
son does not expose his private parts 'lewdly' . . unless his conduct is sex-
ually motivated." In re Smith, 7 Cal. 3d 362, 366, 497 P.2d 807, 810, 102
Cal Rptr. 335, 338 (1972).
105. See text accompanying note 100 supra.
temporary standards of decency is the new California sex law.100
This new law removes criminal sanctions for adulterous cohabita-
tion, sodomy, and oral copulation performed by consenting adults
in private.107 The legislature has, in effect, legalized private
homosexual conduct. In essence, the new law serves as a legislative
pronouncement of the evolving standards of contemporary decency,
significantly relevant in the area of homosexual behavior.
Of even greater importance is the coincidental impact of the new
sex law on section 647(a). Section 647 (a) remains the chief prose-
cutorial weapon to punish public homosexual conduct, and the new
sex law has little, if any, direct effect. Indirectly, however, the
impetus of the new pronouncement will most likely produce sub-
stantial changes in the application of section 647 (a). While private
consensual homosexual behavior is legalized by the new enactment,
section 647 (a) punishes the mere public solicitation to engage in
such conduct. This legal paradox poses the immediate question of
whether the solicitation portion of section 647 (a) can constitution-
ally coexist with the new law.108 Notwithstanding this constitu-
tional issue, being made to register for publicly inviting someone
to engage in conduct now countenanced by society is certainly un-
usual, if not foolish.
Accordingly, compulsory registration for section 647(a) offenses
is unacceptable. Its punitiveness, uniqueness and foolishness com-
pel the conclusion -that it is repugnant to contemporary standards
of decency. Consequently, Anderson'09 demands the invalidation
of the registration requirement for section 647 (a) convictions.
CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court has recently shown a proclivity
for sustaining claims based on the constitutional prohibition of cruel
or unusual punishment. With this in mind, there is a persuasive
case, based on the principles propounded in the Anderson-Lynch
decisions," 0 that the registration requirement for disorderly con-
duct convictions is cruel and unusual. Registration is cruel. Its
106. See WEsT's CAniFo~iuA LEGISLATnVE SERVICE, ch. 71 at 144 (1975).
107. Id. at 146-47. California Penal Code sections 269a, 269b, 286.1, and
288b were repealed. Section 288a was substantially amended.
108. The new sex law's underlying thrust will subject the act of soliciting
to first amendment challenges despite the traditional interpretation that
solicitation is not being proscribed as speech, but as conduct.
109. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152,
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972).
110. Id.; In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217
(1972).
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nondiscretionary application provides absolutely no opportunity to
consider the particular nature of ithe offender, the relative danger
the offense presents to society, or the circumstances giving rise to
the conviction. Its value as a preventive device is virtually non-
existent. Consequently, registration is an unjustified penalty im-
posed solely on the status of being a homosexual. Furthermore,
registration is unusual when compared with the treatment afforded
other sex offenders in California and other jurisdictions. In effect,
the -registration of 647(a) offenders precludes any societal benefit
that registration might otherwise provide in the prevention of more
serious sex crimes. Its "ignominious badge" is unwarranted and
therefore can only damage this type of registrant. The continued
imposition of registration on these minor offenders is unconstitu-
tionally cruel and unusual.
JimuY D. Bu~ni
